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comparative advantage acts as an agglomeration force given that it has an intersectoral nature
and favours a sustainable core-periphery outcome. We note what follows
Proposition 8 When the manufacturing sector is agglomerated in the region with a technological
disadvantage, an increase of trade costs enhances agglomeration if trade costs are small (φ is low)
and dispersion if trade costs are intermediate (φ is intermediate). However, when the manufac-
turing sector is agglomerated in the region with a technological advantage, an increase of trade
costs may only reduce agglomeration.
Previous proposition recalls the results by Ricci ([13], p. 367), who, in a different framework,
obtains that “if the large country has a comparative disadvantage, a rise in trade costs may
enhance agglomeration”.
Finally, we have not so far considered how the productivity differential gap is determined.
One determinant could be the existence of geographically localized spillovers which may produce
higher productivity levels in the region in which all skilled workers are concentrated. However, if
a too high concentration of workers creates some problems of coordination in the organization of
the production process, then this kind of congestion force at work would reverse the technological
gap in favour of the region with the lowest concentration of workers.
4 Symmetric equilibrium stability
In this section we reclassify centripetal and centrifugal forces with respect to the symmetric equi-
librium in order to take into account the fact that technological differences may exist. To evaluate
the intensity of centripetal and centrifugal forces in the symmetric equilibrium we rewrite expres-
sion (15) in the following way:
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Rr are equilibrium sales of a firm in region r, and an analogous expression, Rv, can be obtained
for region v. We evaluate Rr in order to define different centripetal and centrifugal forces that are
in action when the two regional economies are in the neighborhood of the symmetric equilibrium.
Particularly, as in the previous section, we distinguish between fixed-technology (or traditional
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forces) and variable-technology (or non-traditional forces).12 Starting from a symmetric equilib-
rium, if a technological gap arises, it needs to be closed in order to allow a return to the same.
An initial departure from the perfectly symmetric situation described in the symmetric equilib-
rium, gives rise to traditional and less traditional agglomeration and dispersion forces. Traditional
forces are identified by Baldwin et al. [1] as follows: two agglomeration forces, respectively called
market-access and cost of living effects, and one dispersion force, the so-called market-crowding
effect. These forces continue to act in our version of the model, and they may be commented
following Baldwin et al. [1]. However, in our version, technological differences may add a further
agglomeration force because they drive away the two economies from the symmetric equilibrium.
It is, in fact, particularly easy to verify that when, for instance, ar increases with respect to av,
for given values of other factors in Rr and Rv, Rr increases with respect to Rv giving firms the
incentive to move from region v to region r, increasing labor demand in r and, in so doing, en-
couraging a more intensive migration toward this region. We notice that the intensity of these
forces increases for higher values of µ.
In order to study symmetric equilibrium stability in greater detail, we must remember that
it requires all variables, endogenous and exogenous, and all parameters to be equal in the two
regions. Specifically, from a technological point of view, this requires that ar = av = a. Moreover,
following Fujita et al. [4], we recall that in the neighborhood of the symmetric equilibrium,
changes in the value of a regional variable are associated with changes of the same amount, but of
the inverse sign, in the correspondent variable in the other region. For instance, a change in the
number of skilled workers in a region, dHr, is associated with the change dHv = −dHr in the other
region. This is still valid in our simple extension of the standard model, where we also need to
consider that regional productivity level changes, described by (19), depend on the interregional
distribution of skilled workers. It is easily verified that in the neighborhood of the symmetric
equilibrium dar = −dav.
12 Expression (33) is useful for comparing our results with the ones presented in Baldwin et al. [1].
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From the choice of the numèraire and from the assumption on the traditional good, we know
that
par = pav = wlr = wlv = 1 (34)
After substituting prices from (11), we derive the first order Taylor expansion in the neighborhood
of the symmetric equilibrium for: each manufacturing variety produced in both regions (15),
the manufacturing price indexes (4), skilled workers’ real wages (17), and total regional incomes
(18). The resulting expressions are used to derive, after a number of appropriate substitutions,
expression (35):
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where Z = (1−φ)(1+φ) and ∆
0 = (1−σ)Z
2−Zµ+σ
(1−σ) . Z is an index of the “closedness” of trade with its
value that range from 0, with free trade to 1, with autarchy. Expression (35) shows how regional
real wages changes in the neighborhood of the symmetric equilibrium, d'h, depend on changes
in the regional number of skilled workers dH, and on changes in technological development levels,
da.
We have already noticed that in correspondence to the symmetric equilibrium we have: ar =
av = a and we normalize a = 1. Therefore (35) can be rewritten as follows
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Finally, from the first order Taylor expansion in the neighborhood of the symmetric equilibrium
for equation (20), we get
da = κdH (37)
20
Substituting (37) in (36) gives
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Finally, we recall that ρ = (σ − 1)/σ, and we rewrite (38) as follows
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The symmetric equilibrium is stable if d'h/dH is less than 0, and on the contrary it is unstable
if it is greater than (or equal to) 0. We observe that the sign of p−µm (1− ρ) /ρ in (39) is always
positive. Hence, the sign of d'h/dH depends on the sign of two terms: the denominator, which
we call d, and the term in curly brackets, which we call g. These terms are respectively
d = 1− (1− ρ)Zµ− ρZ2 (40)
and
g = g0 − g1 (41)
with
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We can recall that parameters µ, ρ and Z assume values contained in the range [0, 1]. We consider
how different values of Z determine the sign of d and g, which jointly affect the sign of d'h/dH,
and, therefore, the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium.
We note that for given values of µ and ρ, d is a parabola that opens downward, whose graphic is
given in figure 3, where only the relevant range of Z values, that is 0 ≤ Z ≤ 1, must be considered.
Insert figure 3 about here
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If Z = 0, then d = 1. d has its maximum value for a negative value of Z. Hence, for Z ∈ [0, 1], d
is decreasing and its intercept with the axis of abscissas is Zd =
−µ(1−ρ)+
√
µ2(1−ρ)2+4ρ
2ρ . It is easy
to show that Zd > 1, given that for Z = 1, d = (1− µ) (1− ρ) > 0.
Finally, to complete the study of the sign of d'h/dH, we need to discern two cases: case I and
case II. In case I, a higher share of skilled workers in a region does not imply a higher (or lower)
productivity level. In other words, there are no geographically localized technological externalities,
and, thus, κ = 0. Instead, in case II, κ can be positive due to the existence of a technological
positive (negative) externality that implies a higher (lower) productivity level of the region in
which the skilled worker’ share is higher. In particular, as it was stressed in the introduction, we
will concentrate on the study in which, if there exists any technological externality, this is of the
positive type, with κ > 0.
4.1 Case I: κ = 0.
When geographically localized technological externalities do not exist, that is when κ = 0, g
coincides with g0 given in expression (42). In the plane (g0, Z), g0 is a parabola that opens
downward, and its graphic is represented in figure 4a.
Insert figure 4a about here
The intercepts of g0 with the Z-axis are Z = 0 and Z0 = µ(1+ρ)(ρ+µ2) > 0, while its maximum occurs
at Z = µ(1+ρ)2(ρ+µ2) .
It can be proved that if ρ > µ, that is if the “no black hole condition” identified by Fujita et
al. [4] holds, then Z0 < 1. Thus, we may enunciate the following proposition.
Proposition 9 If κ = 0, the symmetric equilibrium is stable for Z ∈ (Z0, 1]; it is unstable for
Z ∈ [0, Z0], with Z0 = µ(1+ρ)(ρ+µ2) .
This means that the symmetric equilibrium is stable only if trade costs are high and the degree
of integration is small, while it is unstable for low trade costs. These results are in line with those
22
by Fujita et al. [4]. Moreover, we may remark that if κ = 0 and a = 1, expression (39) coincides
with the expression by Fujita et al. [4] at page 73
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(43)
and, in this case, the symmetric equilibrium unstable for Z ∈ [0, Z0] and stable for Z ∈ (Z0, 1],
with the break point level of trade costs τρ/(1−ρ) = (ρ+µ)(1+µ)(ρ−µ)(1−µ) . In this work we show that these
ranges change when κ > 0.
4.2 Case II: κ > 0
When positive geographically localized technological externalities exist, that is when κ > 0, in
expression (39) g is given by g0 minus g1 in expression (42). We have already discussed the
properties of g0. g1 is a parabola that opens upward. The intercepts of g1 with the Z-axis are
Z = Z1 and Z = Z2. We notice that Z1 > 1 and Z2 < 0, given that the following results hold:
g1 = (µ− 1)µρκ < 0 when Z = 1; g1 = − ρ
2
1−ρκ < 0 when Z = 0, and that the minimum of g1 is
for Z ∈ [0, 1]. In fact, the slope of the parabola is negative (that is −(1− ρ)µ < 0) when Z = 0,
and it is positive (and equal to ρ (1 + µ) + ρ− µ+ 2µ2(1− ρ) > 0) when Z = 1.13
The graphic of g1 is represented in figure 4b, where only Z ∈ [0, 1] are the relevant values of
the closedness of trade.
Insert figure 4b about here
We must remember that in this section we consider only parameter values for which the “no black
hole condition” holds, with ρ > µ.
Comparing g1 with g0 it is possible to define the sign of expression g in (39). g is always
positive (negative) when Z is such that g0 > g1 (g0 < g1). We know that g0 and g1 cross only
once when Z is positive, when Z = Z∗. Therefore, we may state that g is positive (negative)
when 0 ≤ Z < Z∗ (Z > Z∗). However, we notice that Z∗ can be higher or lower than 1. Clearly,
13 Note that the “no black hole condition” identified by Fujita et al. [4] holds with ρ > µ.
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we are interested in defining the sign of g only for Z ∈ [0, 1], that is for the relevant values of the
closedness of trade.
Proposition 10 When Z∗ < 1, the symmetric equilibrium is stable for Z ∈ (Z∗, 1] and unstable
for Z ∈ [0, Z∗]. When Z∗ ≥ 1, the symmetric equilibrium is always unstable.
Consequently, to avoid the case in which the symmetric equilibrium is unstable for every value
of Z, a new condition must be stated that we call “pro dispersion condition” and that will be
explicitly defined in the following pages.
First, we want to underline that given the shape of the two parabolas g0 and g1, their inter-
section in Z∗ may identify two subcases, respectively denoted A and B, according to the values of
parameters in the model.14
Case 11 (A) If parameter values are such that g0 < g1 when Z = 1, then Z∗ < 1.
Case 12 (B) If parameter values are such that g0 > g1 when Z = 1, then Z∗ > 1.
Specifically, we must establish when Z∗ ≶ 1. The sign of the inequality depends on the
value of κ, the index of the geographically localized technological externalities. A necessary and
sufficient condition that must be satisfied in order to have a range of Z values for which the
symmetric equilibrium is stable is that g1 > g0 when Z = 1. It can be readily verified that
g1(Z = 1) > g0(Z = 1) if
κ < κ∗ =
2(ρ− µ)
µρ
(44)
Therefore a range of Z values for which the symmetric equilibrium is stable does exist, only if
κ < κ∗ with κ∗ > 0 (45)
Therefore, the above mentioned “pro dispersion condition” must hold with κ < κ∗ in order to
have at least some value of trade costs for which the symmetric equilibrium is stable. Figure 5
shows the case in which the symmetric equilibrium may be stable (because κ < κ∗), while figure
14 To compare our results with those by Krugman [6] and [7], we remind that we consider this traditional no
black hole condition because we start from the point in which ar = av = 1.
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6 shows the case in which the symmetric equilibrium is always unstable (because κ > κ∗).
Insert figure 5 about here
Insert figure 6 about here
Comparing the sign of expression g with that of d, we may write what follows.
Proposition 13 When 0 < κ < κ∗, Z∗ < 1 exists and the symmetric equilibrium is stable when
Z ∈ (Z∗, 1] (because d'hdH < 0), and unstable when Z ∈ [0, Z∗] (because
d'h
dH ≥ 0).
Proposition 14 When κ > κ∗, the symmetric equilibrium is unstable ∀Z ∈ [0, 1] given that
Z∗ > 1 (because d'hdH > 0).
The range of Z for which the symmetric equilibrium is stable when κ > 0 is smaller than that
for κ = 0. We may compare the ranges that we obtain for κ = 0 with those that correspond to
κ > 0 and write the following proposition.
Proposition 15 In general, when we consider the symmetric equilibrium and the productivity
level is positively related to skilled workers density in the neighborhood of the symmetric equilibrium
(κ > 0), the range of Z for which the symmetric equilibrium is stable is smaller than in the case
in which the positive externality does not exist (κ = 0).
We may comment on this result considering expression (33). The migration of a certain number
of skilled workers move regional economies from the symmetric equilibrium in its neighborhood.
Let us consider, for instance, the case in which a certain number of skilled workers moves from
region v to region r. In this case the centrifugal force generated by the market crowding effect
in region r is weaker than centripetal forces. Indeed, prices in the larger market r diminish
because its productivity increases and skilled workers real wages increase in r, strengthening the
intensity of centripetal forces and reducing the range of Z for which the symmetric equilibrium is
stable. Thanks to the geographically localized externality generated when κ > 0, the intensity of
centripetal forces increases with respect to the centrifugal one. Hence, the width of Z for which the
symmetric equilibrium is stable is reduced with respect to the case in which this externality does
not exist (κ = 0). The technological externality produced by a positive κ value does strengthen
the variable-technology centripetal force reducing the width of the range of Z values for which the
symmetric equilibrium is stable.
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We notice that when κ increases, the width of the range for which the symmetric equilibrium
is stable decreases. Moreover, it can be readily verified that
∂κ∗
∂µ
< 0 and ∂κ
∗
∂ρ
> 0
Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium is more likely to be stable, the smaller the share of expen-
ditures in manufacturing and the degree of product differentiation are.
Finally, let us show relative real wages as a function of workers share in region r, to simulate
possible outcomes for different levels of trade costs. For this exercise we need to specify how
productivity levels depend on workers density, and we use the following equation
ar = 1 + [bHr(1−Hr) + c] (Hr −
1
2
) (46)
with b ≥ 0 and c that are shape parameters.15 Figures 7a and 7b plot relative real wage
(premium) in the two regions as a function of the workers’ share in region r, when b > 0 and
c = 0. Figure 7a represents the case in which τ = 2.11 and shows that the symmetric equilibrium
is stable either when κ = 0 or κ > 0. However, if trade costs are smaller with τ = 2, the symmetric
equilibrium is still stable in the case of no geographically localized externalities, but it is unstable
with positive externalities (Figure 7b).16
Insert figures 7a,b about here
15 Expression (46) is an ad hoc equation that has the following properties: if skilled workers are uniformly
distributed between the two regions, regional manufacturing productivity levels are equal, that is ar = av = 1.
However, if a certain number of skilled workers migrate towards one of the two regions, let say for instance the
north, the northern productivity level becomes higher than 1, while that of the south smaller than 1. Specifically,
to have these results, κ = b/4 + c must be positive. These assumptions reflect the fact that labor productivity
becomes higher, the higher the number of skilled workers in that particular region is. This fact reflects positive
geographically localized externalities. Increasing the number of skilled workers in a region, increases the density of
these workers in the same region and, therefore, may increase knowledge spillovers among the same workers, and,
in turn, this increases regional productivity. For this particular goal, c would be sufficient, and b could vanish.
Moreover, if c were negative, the externality would be negative describing a congestion effect. However, this could
not always be the case, given that productivity levels may decrease also when κ > 0, only if the number of workers
becomes too high (at a level of Hr > 1/2). This phenomenon may take place because when the number of skilled
workers in a regions becomes too high, it becomes more difficult to coordinate their production activity, or because
congestion processes would reduce productivity levels. This is captured by coefficient b > 0. The range of admissible
values for c is (−2, 2) to avoid negative values of ar .
Finally, when c is negative, and b is such that κ = b/4 + c > 0, congestions effects (described by c) may become
so high that they involve a productivity level smaller than 1 when mobile workers are completely concentrated in
a region. (See, for instance, figure 8)
16 Figures 7a and 7b are drawn for: b = 0.2; σ = 3.33; µ = 0.3.
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Finally, if c is negative, and b is such that the geographically localized externality is positive in
the neighborhood of the symmetric equilibrium, that is κ = b/4 + c > 0, congestions effects may
become so strong to imply a productivity level smaller than 1 when mobile workers are completely
concentrated in one region. In this case, figure 8 shows that while the symmetric equilibrium
is stable for high trade costs (τ = 6), it is unstable for lower trade costs (τ = 3 and τ = 2).17
Moreover, due to the existence of strong congestion effects, full agglomeration is never stable,
while two asymmetric equilibria may be stable.
Insert figure 8 about here
5 Conclusion
This work re-examines Krugman model properties when interregional productivity differences
may arise in the modern sector. This reassessment is achieved by means of the description of
the intensities of centripetal and centrifugal forces which determine the sustainability of the full
agglomeration equilibria of the modern sector.18 We show how different parameters of the model
concur to determine centripetal and centrifugal forces intensities, either in the case of “fixed-
technology” or traditional forces, or in the case of “variable-technology” forces.
Moreover, our modified version of the standard economic geography model confirms the finding
by Venables [15] that is with Ricardian differences there could exist equilibria characterized by the
localization of sectors in the region in which they have a comparative disadvantage, even tough this
could happen only for intermediate trade costs. However, we find that when the two regions are
sufficiently integrated, the comparative advantage dominates and production localization reflects
the comparative advantage with manufacturing production agglomerated in the more productive
region, while the agricultural good is produced in both regions. A similar result is obtained by
Forslid and Wooton ([3], p. *) who find that “when trade barriers are sufficiently low, comparative
17 Figure 8 is drawn for: σ = 3.33; µ = 0.3; b = 9; c = −1.
18 Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud [1] stress that the evaluation of agglomeration and
dispersion forces in fully agglomerated equilibria is rather difficult.
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